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Abstract—Recommender systems are widely used by online
retailers to promote products and content that are most likely to
be of interest to a specific customer. In such systems, users often
implicitly or explicitly rate products they have consumed, and
some form of collaborative filtering is used to find other users
with similar tastes to whom the products can be recommended.
While users can benefit from more targeted and relevant recom-
mendations, they are also exposed to greater risks of privacy loss,
which can lead to undesirable financial and social consequences.
The use of obfuscation techniques to preserve the privacy of
user ratings is well studied in the literature. However, works
on obfuscation typically assume that all users uniformly apply
the same level of obfuscation. In a heterogeneous environment,
in which users adopt different levels of obfuscation based on
their comfort level, the different levels of obfuscation may impact
the users in the system in a different way. In this work we
consider such a situation and make the following contributions:
(a) using an offline dataset, we evaluate the privacy-utility trade-
off in a system where a varying portion of users adopt the
privacy preserving technique. Our study highlights the effects
that each user’s choices have, not only on their own experience
but also on the utility that other users will gain from the
system; and (b) we propose PrivacyCanary, an interactive system
that enables users to directly control the privacy-utility trade-
off of the recommender system to achieve a desired accuracy
while maximizing privacy protection, by probing the system
via a private (i.e., undisclosed to the system) set of items.
We evaluate the performance of our system with an off-line
recommendations dataset, and show its effectiveness in balancing
a target recommender accuracy with user privacy, compared to
approaches that focus on a fixed privacy level.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online retailers and content providers deliver a huge variety
of offerings, and matching consumers with the most relevant
products is pivotal to both user satisfaction and the service
providers’ revenues. Consequently, these service providers
have made recommender systems a salient part of their Web
sites, as they analyze patterns of user interest in products to
offer personalized recommendations to individual users. The
use of recommender systems has in fact become widespread
in online services, as exemplified by large retail sites like
Amazon1 or eBay2 and content providers like Netflix3.
Despite the benefits of personalized recommendations, there
is also a negative side to the use of such systems. Rec-
ommendations are based on personal data (e.g., purchase or
1http://www.amazon.com/
2http://www.ebay.com.au/
3https://www.netflix.com/global
viewing history and ratings of items) and can therefore lead
to privacy loss. For example, although recommendations in
online services are derived from aggregated users’ information,
they can be used to infer information about specific users,
aided by only a limited amount of background information
[1], [2]. Such works stress the importance of incorporating
privacy-enhancing mechanisms into recommender systems.
Proposed solutions to this problem rely on cryptographic
techniques [3], privacy enhancement via a centralized trusted
entity [4], or local (client side) data obfuscation. In this paper
we focus on local obfuscation of users’ ratings to protect
privacy against either the service provider or third party
inference of users’ private information, where the obfuscation
can be performed by a user agent (e.g., a browser plugin or
other client-side software). Client side data obfuscation has
been studied extensively in the context of data mining [5],
[6] and it has the advantage of providing privacy protection
without requiring the users to trust the online system, but in
turn it reduces the accuracy of the recommendations. Unlike
the majority of previous work, which targets a specific level of
privacy and aims to maximize the utility (i.e., accuracy of the
recommender system) within this bound, we consider a user-
acceptable utility and propose a mechanism that will achieve
this.
To measure and control the level of privacy obtained through
obfuscation, we rely on differential privacy [7], a rigorous
framework that enables quantification of privacy loss under
arbitrary adversary conditions. We study the resulting trade-
off between privacy and utility in the context of recommender
systems, where users obfuscate their ratings by adding a
selected (according to the desired privacy setting) level of
obfuscation noise. We provide the following contributions:
• Using an off-line movie ratings dataset, we evaluate the
trade-off between privacy and accuracy of recommen-
dations when a varying portion of users in the system
obfuscate the reported ratings. We evaluate the cumulative
effect of the obfuscation conducted by different users,
and show how the rating prediction accuracy for each
user is affected both by this user’s privacy choices and
by other users’ choices. We show that the impact of
noise introduced directly by a user, on their rating
prediction accuracy, is significantly greater than the
resulting impact of noise added by other system users.
For example, a target prediction accuracy of 0.946 for
a specific user could be maintained either when the
user added a low level of noise directly to his ratings
(while other system users contributed non-noisy ratings),
or when 20% of the users in the system (188 in our
experiments) obfuscated their data with the same noise
level (while the target user contributed non-noisy ratings).
• We propose PrivacyCanary, an adaptive obfuscation
mechanism that allows users to toggle the obfuscation
level based on the prediction accuracy estimated using a
reference set of canary items4 and targeting a desired
accuracy of the predictions. The canary set consists
of a small number of user ratings that are not disclosed
to the recommender system. We evaluate our algorithm
using the same dataset of movie ratings, and demonstrate
that this algorithm can effectively maintain the desired
accuracy level. We further show that, compared to ran-
dom selection of canary items, choosing movies from the
extreme (most or least liked) user’s items leads to a lower
deviation from the target accuracy, with an error lowered
by a factor of close to 2.
Whereas prior studies of obfuscation techniques assume
a uniform policy employed by all users, we believe our
work is the first to study how the utility provided by the
system changes as different fractions of the user commu-
nity adopt privacy-enhancing technologies. In addition, the
proposed interactive obfuscation mechanism allows the user
agent to change the level of obfuscation to obtain the desired
level of accuracy while taking into account the dynamically
changing influence of inputs from other system users. While
our proposal provides a best-effort level of privacy (as each
user item can have a specific level of obfuscation and a
corresponding privacy guarantee), we believe that a target
accuracy level is a more meaningful metric for the user. We
argue that the primary purpose of the recommender system
should not be compromised as the system would otherwise
have no meaningful purpose. Regardless, we note that this
approach can be easily modified to track the cumulative loss of
privacy, and take action if losing privacy beyond some bound
warrants quitting use of the system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Existing
privacy preserving solutions for recommender systems are
reviewed in Section II. We present our system setup and back-
ground in Section III, and evaluate the privacy-utility trade-off
using the MovieLens dataset in Section IV. Section V presents
our adaptive obfuscation mechanism, and demonstrates its
effectiveness in achieving the desired level of accuracy. We
discuss our results in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy-aware recommender systems were studied in a num-
ber of prior works, including approaches such as homomorphic
encryption of user data [3], [8]; decentralizing storage and
operating the recommender system in a distributed manner [9],
[10]; and data modification techniques (most closely related to
4Canary birds were used in coal mining as an early warning system.
this paper) to limit the profiling accuracy of the recommender
system.
Data modification techniques include approaches such as
data obfuscation [11], [12], data randomization [13], and
differentially private recommenders [4], [14]. They allow users
to modify their ratings by adding random noise to prevent the
recommender system from deriving the users’ actual ratings.
Polat and Du [13] aimed to find a perturbation algorithm that
imposes the smallest error on recommendations while ensuring
that users will get a high level of privacy. Berkovsky et al. [11]
evaluated experimentally the impact of data obfuscation on
the accuracy of the generated predictions. While we adopt the
same data obfuscation technique to perturb the users’ answers,
we take a different perspective that captures the performance
of the system when different fractions of the user community
apply the privacy mechanism.
Differential privacy [7], [15] provides provable guarantees
of privacy under arbitrary adversary conditions. Works on
differentially private recommender systems [4], [14] focused
on event-level privacy, where privacy is guaranteed for each
rating (rather than with respect to each user), and studied
how a central entity could generate differentially private
recommendations from the collected data. In this work we
rely on event-level differential privacy obtained through input
perturbation, where the noise is added by the users before
submitting the responses to the system. We perform experi-
mental evaluation of the impact that user response obfuscation
has on the recommender accuracy, and we study how the
recommender accuracy changes depending on the number of
privacy-conscious users that obfuscate their inputs.
Weinsberg et al. [2] studied obfuscating user ratings, with
the goal of obtaining accurate recommendations while pre-
venting inferences on user demographics. E.g., the privacy
gain obtained by obfuscation is captured via the reduced
performance in inference of gender based on the user ratings.
Chen et al. [16] studied how the adoption of privacy policies
by different proportions of users affects inference attacks in
online social networks. In contrast, we consider their effect
on prediction accuracy in the context of recommendation
systems.
III. SYSTEM SETUP
We consider a generic system architecture, where the users
access an online service that also includes recommender
system functionality (within the system, or provided externally,
by an analytics service), as shown in Figure 1.
A. Entities and System Components
Users utilize the online (shopping or content provider)
service and also use the associated recommendation system.
For the latter, they provide ratings for the items purchased or
viewed using a client-side software, e.g., a browser add-on or a
mobile app. The software obfuscates the users’ ratings before
they are sent to the recommender system by adding noise,
where the magnitude of noise is calibrated according to the
level of privacy chosen by the user. We note that the privacy
Online 
service  
Recommender  
system  
Users 
Data obfuscation 
Fig. 1. System architecture
level needs to be determined by considering two contradict-
ing objectives: users’ privacy preferences, and system utility
(receiving meaningful recommendations on relevant products).
The recommender system acquires rating and transaction
data from users and generates personalized recommendations.
The objective of the recommender system is to accurately
predict user preferences for future viewings or purchases.
For our study, we utilize matrix factorization [17], the state-
of-the-art technique in recommender systems. The input to the
recommendation process is a set R of ratings of n users over
m items, such that each element rui ∈ R is a rating that user
u assigned to item i. The matrix factorization process derives
two low-rank matrices with d latent factors: Pn×d for users
and Qm×d for items, where each row pu in P pertains to a
user, and each row qi in Q pertains to an item. The matrices are
constructed such that they provide an accurate approximation
for the known ratings, i.e., for all the known ratings, the
predicted rating of user u for item i, r̂ui, maintains r̂ui ≈ rui.
To this end, the following loss function is minimized:
JS(P,Q) :=
∑
rui∈R
[(rui − puq⊺i )
2+γ(∥pu∥2+∥qi∥2)] , (1)
where γ is a regularization parameter that prevents overfitting.
A predicted rating of user u for item i is then given by r̂ui =
pu · q⊺i . In this work we use matrix factorization as a black
box, and a similar evaluation could be conducted with any
other collaborative filtering algorithm.
B. Data Obfuscation Using Differential Privacy
To measure the privacy protection resulting from data obfus-
cation (perturbation of the recommender system input), we rely
on the differential privacy framework [7]. Differential privacy
sets strict bounds on the sensitivity of the outcome of the
computation to any particular record in the input. We say that
two datasets A and B are neighbors if they differ only in a
single record. I.e., ∃rui, r′ui such that A = B \ {rui} ∪ {r′ui}.
A mechanism M provides (ϵ,δ)-differential privacy if for
any neighboring datasets A and B, and for all outcomes
S ⊆ Range(M):
Pr[M(A) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ϵ)× Pr[M(B) ∈ S] + δ . (2)
Differential privacy guarantees that an adversary will not be
able to infer any particular rating (i.e., the difference between
the datasets A and B) from the outcome of the computation
regardless of the computational power or the background
knowledge available to the adversary. The parameter ϵ controls
the level of privacy, where smaller values of ϵ provide stricter
bounds on the influence of any particular input record on the
outcome, and therefore provide better privacy. The parameter δ
allows relaxing the condition in Equation (2) from the stricter
definition of ϵ-differential privacy [7], in which δ = 0.
The privacy options considered by users should be simple
enough for the lay user to understand, so we adopt a simple
set of four privacy levels: no, low, medium and high. In the
experimental evaluation, we use two different noise distribu-
tions, namely Laplace and Gaussian, to generate differentially
private noise to obfuscate the users’ responses.
The Laplace mechanism [7] can be used to perturb the user
response while conforming to ϵ-differential privacy. A Laplace
distribution with a scale parameter b (and variance σ2 = 2b2)
has probability density function Pr(x|b) = 12b exp(−|x|/b).
Given the range ∆ of the user’s possible answers, the Laplace
mechanism obtains ϵ-differential privacy by adding to each
input noise sampled from the Laplace distribution, with its
scale b calibrated through the relation:
ϵ =
∆
b
. (3)
Similarly, (ϵ,δ)-differential privacy can be obtained by per-
turbing the inputs with Gaussian noise N (0, σ2) [18], cali-
brated through the relation:
ϵσ2
2∆2
+ ln(ϵσ2) ≥ ln 1
δ
. (4)
Example 1: Consider a 5-point rating scale commonly used
in movie ratings, with ratings between 1 (very poor) and
5 (excellent). We use noise with standard deviation σ = 0
for no privacy, σ =
√
2 for low privacy, σ = 4
√
2 for
medium privacy, and σ = 8
√
2 for high privacy (note that the
obfuscated responses will consequently be real-valued rather
than integers) for both Laplace and Gaussian distributions.
With ∆ = 5 − 1 = 4 and δ = 0, the low, medium and high
privacy settings correspond to ϵ = 4, ϵ = 1 and ϵ = 0.5
respectively for Laplace noise. Setting δ = 0.01, the low,
medium and high privacy settings correspond to ϵ = 17.1,
ϵ = 1.07 and ϵ = 0.26 respectively for Gaussian noise.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF CLIENT-SIDE
OBFUSCATION
To evaluate the impact of client-side obfuscation on the
accuracy of the resulting recommendations, we conducted
an experimental evaluation using the MyMediaLite [19] rec-
ommender system library (version 3.04) and the MovieLens
100K dataset [20]. The dataset contains 100K ratings from
943 users, who rated 1682 movies. Each user rated 106.04
movies on average.
Table I summarizes the parameter values that were used in
the matrix factorization algorithm throughout the experiments.
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Fig. 2. The impact of Laplace noise on rating prediction accuracy
We conducted a separate evaluation to tune the parameters so
that the prediction error of a non-private recommender over
the MovieLens 100K dataset is minimized.
TABLE I
THE PARAMETERS USED FOR MATRIX FACTORIZATION
Parameter Value
Number of factors 10
Regularization Parameter 0.1
Learning rate 0.1
Number of iterations 40
Section IV-A outlines the evaluation criteria in our exper-
iments. In Section IV-B we consider the direct impact of
the user’s privacy choices and the level of obfuscation on
the resulting prediction accuracy of this user’s ratings. Sec-
tion IV-A extends this evaluation to assess how this accuracy is
influenced by the obfuscation conducted by other users in the
system. Finally, we present in Section IV-D a game-theoretic
interpretation of our results and its implication on user choices.
A. Evaluation Criteria
Enhancing privacy through obfuscation of user ratings im-
poses some error on the accuracy of the recommendation
system. We evaluate the cost (in accuracy) of obfuscation by
comparing the prediction error in our system to that in a system
without privacy protection. In both cases we compute the
prediction error based on the root mean square error (RMSE).
Let rui ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} be the rating that user u assigned
to item i. We denote by r̂ui the system’s prediction for that
rating. Let Ru = {rvi ∈ R|v = u} be the ratings of user u. To
evaluate the RMSE for a particular user u in rating prediction,
we use “leave-one-out” cross validation. The data set is split
into training and test data, where a data point rui is taken as
the test data, and the remaining ratings R \ {rui} are taken as
the training data used to predict the rating r̂ui. The prediction
error rui − r̂ui is then calculated for that particular rating.
The process is repeated over all the ratings rui ∈ Ru and the
squared prediction error is averaged to yield the RMSE of that
particular user u, given by:
RMSEu =
√√√√ ∑rui∈Ru (rui − r̂ui)2
|Ru|
. (5)
The overall RMSE of the recommender system RMSES is
then evaluated by:
RMSES =
∑
u∈U
RMSEu
/
|U | , (6)
where U is the set of users in the dataset.
We note that this measure is slightly different from the
typical RMSE measurement used to evaluate overall system
accuracy, in which the mean value is evaluated over the ratings,
rather than over the user averages:
RMSE∗ =
√√√√ ∑u∈U,rui∈Ru (rui − r̂ui)2
|R|
. (7)
We believe the measurement in Equation 6 is more suitable
in this context, as we investigate the accuracy for each of the
users, rather than the per-rating prediction accuracy. However,
we also report for reference the RMSE measurement per
Equation 7.
We evaluate RMSEu and RMSES both for the system
with no input perturbation (no privacy), and for the system
with different privacy levels (low, medium and high).
B. Obfuscation by a Single User
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of the predictions
for the target user when that user obfuscates their ratings. The
noise settings (i.e., Laplace and Gaussian Noise) for which we
conducted our experiments are described next.
To provide privacy, Laplace noise with mean 0 and scale b
(calibrated using Eq. (3)) is added locally to the user’s ratings
to perturb them before they are sent to the recommender
system. In this experiment only the ratings of the target user
are perturbed, while the ratings of other users are used without
any noise added. The root mean square error for the target user
u (RMSEu) is calculated by averaging the prediction error
TABLE II
PRIVACY AND ACCURACY TRADE-OFFS
Parameters Low Medium High
Laplace Std.dev of the noise
√
2 4
√
2 8
√
2
noise Privacy budget ϵ 4 1 0.5
RMSES 0.9460 1.7791 2.5841
Std. dev ofRMSES 0.0885 0.0963 0.1032
RMSE∗ 0.8442 0.9659 1.5041
Gaussian Std.dev of the noise
√
2 4
√
2 8
√
2
noise Privacy budget ϵ 17.1 1.07 0.26
RMSES 0.9216 1.7104 2.2255
Std. dev ofRMSES 0.0791 0.0845 0.0978
RMSE∗ 0.8095 0.9034 1.2568
over all of target user u’s ratings. This evaluation is conducted
over all 943 users of the MovieLens 100K dataset to esti-
mate RMSES . The same experiment is repeated also using
Gaussian noise (where the ϵ and δ parameters are calibrated
using Equation (4)), using the same standard deviation used
for Laplace noise.
Fig. 2(a) shows the average RMSE in prediction across
all the users in the dataset when the data is obfuscated
with Laplace noise. The X-axis depicts the users sorted in
ascending order of the number of movies rated by each user.
Each point in this figure represents RMSEu of a particular
user, averaged over 100 simulation runs. Different lines in the
plot represent the different noise settings chosen by the user
(see Table II). This plot demonstrates the impact of the user’s
obfuscation on the prediction accuracy. The error in prediction
is lower for users who rated more movies (i.e., users on the
right). Comparing to the prediction error without the presence
of noise, addition of noise will incur some cost in prediction
accuracy. Unsurprisingly, the figure illustrates that as users
reveal more about their preferences to the system, the system
can predict the user ratings more accurately, and this holds
also for the noisy ratings. Moreover, Figure 2(b) shows the
ratio between the RMSEu obtained by the noisy inputs and
that obtained by the non-private variant, and demonstrates that
the relative cost in accuracy also diminishes as users rate more
items.
Similar results were observed when the user responses are
obfuscated with Gaussian noise and are omitted for brevity.
Table II summarizes the overall privacy-accuracy trade-off
across different privacy settings (no, low, medium and high),
when the data is obfuscated with Laplace or Gaussian noise.
The RMSE values for each privacy level are obtained by
averaging the RMSEu of all the users (Equation 6). We note
that the average RMSE value for the baseline case, when no
noise is added by users, is 0.84. We can observe that the
overall error in prediction (i.e., RMSES) increases as users
add more noise. Consider, for example, a user who wants
to get good (i.e., accurate) recommendations while enhancing
privacy, so that the prediction accuracy stays within an RMSE
of 1.0. In other words, the user is willing to sacrifice an
increase of almost 20% in the RMSE for better privacy. In
that case, the average user should settle for the low privacy
option (equivalent to ϵ = 4), as any higher privacy level would
result in a higher loss of accuracy than would be acceptable
by the user. In general, by changing the noise level, the user
can trade-off the accuracy of the recommendations with the
desired level of privacy.
C. Impact of the Noise Added by Multiple Users
If many users in the system are privacy-conscious, and
obfuscate their responses to protect their privacy, we can
expect that the added noise would have a significant impact
on the overall accuracy of the system, affecting also the
recommendations for users who did not perturb their inputs. In
this section we investigate how the prediction accuracy for a
specific user is influenced by input obfuscation done by other
users. We consider a target user u, who can choose a privacy
level p ∈ {no, low,medium, high} and explore the following
scenarios:
1) User u, along with a fraction of other users in the system,
obfuscate their responses using the same privacy level
p. The remaining users do not obfuscate their ratings.
2) User u is not concerned about privacy (i.e., the user
selected the no privacy option), but a fraction of other
users in the system obfuscate their responses, using the
privacy level p. The remaining users do not obfuscate
their ratings.
3) User u selected the privacy level p to obfuscate re-
sponses, and a fraction of other users in the system
obfuscate their responses with a different privacy level
q. The remaining users do not obfuscate their ratings.
For each of those scenarios, we test the impact of the ob-
fuscation on the prediction accuracy for the particular user u.
The motivation behind the different scenarios is to study which
obfuscation has more significant influence on the prediction
accuracy for user u: the obfuscation done by the user, or by
other users in the system.
Figures 3(a) shows the average RMSE of the generated
predictions of a target user u (RMSEu), while a fraction of
the other users in the system obfuscate their responses with
low privacy noise level from Laplace noise distribution. Each
line in Figure 3(a) represents the privacy level chosen by the
target user u. The RMSE is averaged over all the users in the
dataset for whom RMSEu is evaluated (i.e., 943 experiments
are conducted, each with a different target user u). For each
user u, RMSEu is evaluated based on 100 simulation runs.
Figures 3(b) and 3(c) reflect a similar setup, but with the
fraction of other users choosing medium and high privacy noise
level from Laplace noise distribution respectively. Without any
obfuscation, the RMSE in prediction is around 0.84. Alongside
the average RMSE, we also show error bars that depict the
standard deviation of the prediction error. We make several
observations from these plots.
First, we observe that even when a target user does not
obfuscate his input, the prediction accuracy obtained from the
system decreases as more and more other users obfuscate their
responses (see the no-privacy lines in the figures). As the target
user starts to obfuscate his responses, the error in prediction
significantly increases with the increasing fraction of other
0.7 
1.2 
1.7 
2.2 
2.7 
3.2 
3.7 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
R
M
S
E
S
 
%of other users who add low noise 
No Low Med High 
(a) Other users add low level of Laplace noise
0.7 
1.2 
1.7 
2.2 
2.7 
3.2 
3.7 
4.2 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
R
M
S
E
S
 
% of other users who add medium noise 
No Low Med High 
(b) Other users add medium level of Laplace noise
0.7 
1.2 
1.7 
2.2 
2.7 
3.2 
3.7 
4.2 
4.7 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
R
M
S
E
S
 
% of other users who add high noise 
No Low Med High 
(c) Other users add high level of Laplace noise
Fig. 3. Impact of (a) low (b) medium and (b) high Laplace noise on the accuracy of the recommendations.
users who add noise. Our results indicate that the accuracy
of the predictions of a target user can be increased either by
lowering the privacy level (of the target user and/or of the
other users in the system) or by adjusting the fraction of other
users who obfuscate their data.
Second, the results show that the penalty in RMSE when
both the target user and a fraction of other users in the system
obfuscate the data is more than the combination of penalties
imposed by the obfuscation done by the target user alone, or
the other users in the system. For example, when the target
user adds low privacy obfuscation using Laplace noise while
others do not, the RMSE increases by 0.1 (= 0.94 − 0.84)
with respect to the non-private baseline; when 20% of the
other users add low privacy obfuscation while the target user
does not, the RMSE increases by 0.15 (= 0.99 − 0.84) with
respect to the non-private baseline. However, when both the
target user and 20% of the users add low privacy obfuscation,
the RMSE increases by 0.32 (> 0.1 + 0.15) with respect to
the baseline.
Lastly, our results indicate that the noise addition by the
user incurs a higher cost in prediction accuracy than the noise
added by the other users. For example, in Figure 3(a), the low
level obfuscation done by the target user alone (while no other
user adds noise) results in an average error of 0.95, which is
equivalent to the RMSE resulting from the combined effect of
20% of the other users obfuscating their data (while the target
user does not add noise).
D. Prisoner’s Dilemma
While the experiments conducted in this section explore
only a few simple settings, they offer several insights into the
impact of user decisions on the system as a whole. A user’s
choice affects not only the accuracy of the recommendations
for that user, but also the utility of the system for other
users. While this effect may be negligible when only a single
user obfuscates the input, the cumulative effect of many users
obfuscating the input considerably brings down the accuracy
of the recommendations. In fact, in some cases the options
available to the user may be perceived as a (well known) game
theory paradox, the prisoner’s dilemma [21]. For example,
consider a simple case where the users make a choice between
having either a low level of privacy, or no privacy. We
further assume that, to gain the privacy protection offered
by obfuscation, a typical user would be willing to sacrifice a
loss of accuracy of up to 0.3 in the RMSE measurement. We
consider the overall utility for the user to be a combination of
the recommendations accuracy (represented by RMSEu) and
the privacy protection, where the added value of a low privacy
setting over the no privacy setting amounts to a utility gain
of 0.3. In other words, the utility score is equal to RMSEu
when no privacy protection is in place, and RMSEu − 0.3
when a low level of privacy protection is in place. A lower
value indicates higher utility for the user.
Table III captures the resulting situation for a typical
target user, based on the experimental outcomes reported in
Figure 3(a) (note that the utility gain of 0.3 due to privacy
protection results in correspondingly lower utility scores for
cases where the target user chooses low privacy). We observe
that, regardless of other users’ choices, the target user’s
dominant strategy resulting in the best outcome, i.e., best
utility, is to always obfuscate the input. However, if all users
make this choice, the resulting outcome, for all users, will be
a significantly degraded utility from the system, comparing to
a system where no obfuscation is conducted.
TABLE III
UTILITY VALUES SHOWING THE PRIVACY/ACCURACY TRADE-OFF AS A
PRISONER’S DILEMMA. LOWER VALUE INDICATES HIGHER UTILITY FOR
THE USER
Example user chooses: No privacy Low Privacy
All other users choose:
No Privacy 0.84 0.64 (=0.94-0.3)
Low Privacy 1.38 1.28 (=1.58-0.3)
The game-theoretic point of view suggests that with growing
user awareness of the privacy implications of personalization,
and considering the deficiencies of current recommender sys-
tems in preserving privacy, client-side privacy-enhancing solu-
tions could become more prevalent, and could eventually harm
the performance of personalized systems, to the detriment of
both the users and the service providers. In the next section
we will show an adaptive obfuscation mechanism that allows
to mitigate this problem, and help users achieve a desired level
of accuracy while maximizing obfuscation.
V. ADAPTIVE OBFUSCATION
In Section IV-B we showed how the rating prediction
accuracy for a user is influenced by the cumulative effect of
the privacy choices made by other users in the system. Since
getting adequate prediction accuracy is a key requirement
of the system, we propose a practical approach to balance
privacy and accuracy in this context. The goal is to allow
users to receive reasonably accurate recommendations, but
without completely compromising their privacy. To this end,
we propose PrivacyCanary, an interactive recommendation
service, which can be probed by the users to assess the
expected accuracy of the predicted ratings. This feedback
mechanism allows the users to adapt obfuscation according
to the current performance of the system.
In our system, users obtain predictions from the recom-
mender system and have a pre-determined range of acceptable
prediction accuracy. To control the accuracy of received rec-
ommendations and the level of privacy loss, each user agent
utilizes a reference set of canary items. The canary set is a
set of items that the user rated without disclosing the ratings
to the recommender system. By probing the recommender
engine to obtain the predictions for these canary items, the
user agent can estimate the current recommendation accuracy
and select the appropriate level of obfuscation to maintain ac-
curacy within the acceptable range. Essentially, the user agent
adapts the obfuscation level of subsequently submitted ratings
according to the expected accuracy, so privacy protection can
be maximized while maintaining reasonable accuracy in future
predictions.
We now briefly describe the protocol workflow, which is
repeated each time that a user rates a new item:
Step 1: the user probes the system: the user u keeps a
set Iu of item ratings as canary set and probes the system for
rating predictions for the items in the set.
Step 2: the recommender system sends the predictions
for the canary items: the recommender system executes the
recommendation algorithm to derive predictions for the canary
set.
Step 3: the user adjusts the obfuscation level and
reveals the obfuscated rating for a new item: the exact
process, which takes into account the targeted accuracy level
and modifies the obfuscation level according to the accuracy
bounds, is described in the next section.
A. Targeting a Selected Accuracy Level
1) Evaluation Metrics: The basic premise in this work is
that, rather than selecting a privacy level and evaluating the
resulting accuracy, we select a desired accuracy level and
adjust privacy (i.e., the level of added noise) accordingly.
We assume that each user has a set of item ratings that are
not disclosed to the recommender system, and refer to them
as the canary items. Let Iu denote the set of canary items for
user u, and let rui be the rating that user u gave to canary
item i, where rui ∈ [rmin, rmax]. We denote by r̂ui the system
prediction for u’s rating for item i. The Root Mean Square
Error (RMSE) of user u’s canary set is given by:
RMSEIu =
√∑
i∈Iu (rui − r̂ui)
2
|Iu|
. (8)
We rely on the RMSE of the canary set as a measure for
the expected accuracy of the recommendations.
2) Adaptive Obfuscation Algorithm: Given a set of canary
items Iu of user u, Eq. 8 provides the RMSE of the canary
set. To control the quality of information that the recom-
mender system has about him, the user aims to maintain a
recommendation system accuracy while obfuscating his ratings
(sent sequentially to the system). The user defines the lower
and upper bounds on prediction accuracy (lower error will
result in accurate profiling of the user, while higher error will
result in meaningless recommendations), denoted by el and eu
respectively, and consequently adjusts the obfuscation level if
the prediction errors are not in the desired region, as detailed
in Algorithm 1.
B. Offline Evaluation
In this section we apply the proposed algorithm to the
MovieLens 100K dataset of to study the trade-off between
privacy and accuracy.
Algorithm 1: Adaptive obfuscation: rating a new item
Input :
r – rating for a new item i
Iu – a canary set of items rated by user u
el, eu – lower/upper bounds for canary RMSE
pmin, pmax – minimum/maximum obfuscation levels
p ∈ [pmin, pmax] – current obfuscation level
Output:
Obfuscated rating for the new item
1: e← RMSE(Iu)
2: if (e < el and p < pmax) then increment(p)
3: else if (e > eu and p > pmin) then decrement(p)
4: return Obfuscate (r, p)
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Fig. 4. Accuracy of the predictions of canary set: Randomly chosen canary
set
Since the obfuscation is applied only to the user ratings,
our approach can be used with any recommendation system.
Without loss of generality, in the evaluation we use matrix
factorization as a recommender algorithm, with the same
parameters as in the previous section (see Table I).
We use Laplace noise for obfuscation of user ratings. Each
user is provided with four obfuscation levels, {none, low,
medium and high}. Each level is associated with Laplace noise
with standard deviations σ = 0,
√
2, 4, 4
√
2 respectively.5
To avoid the cold start problem in the recommender al-
gorithm, we start with a non-empty set of known ratings
that are revealed to the recommender system (without any
obfuscation). This allows the recommender system to initially
learn about the user’s preferences, and obfuscating any addi-
tional ratings provided by the user will help the user maintain
privacy.
To evaluate system performance, we randomly selected 100
users who have rated at least 75 movies. We then randomly
chose for each of those users a set of 10 movies as the
canary set (denoted by Iu), a set of 5 movies to bootstrap
the user profile (i.e., the user reveals the ratings of these five
5For ratings in the range [1, 5], in the differential privacy framework these
noise levels can be interpreted as corresponding to event-level privacy with
ϵ = ∞, ϵ = 4, ϵ = 1.4, and ϵ = 1 respectively.
1.5 
1.7 
1.9 
2.1 
2.3 
2.5 
2.7 
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 R
M
S
E
 o
f 
E
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
 S
e
t 
Movies 
No 
Adaptive obfuscation 
(random canary) 
 
Low 
 
Med
 
High 
 
Adaptive obfuscation (mostly 
liked movies as canary) 
 
Fig. 5. Accuracy of the predictions of evaluation set for randomly chosen
and movies that the users like most as canary sets
movies without obfuscation) and 10 movies as an evaluation
set (denoted by Eu). We note that while the RMSE for canary
movies reflects to users the expected level of rating prediction
accuracy, we use the RMSE of the evaluation set to measure
the actual accuracy of recommendations given to the user
based on the obfuscated ratings, i.e., the utility of the system.
Since the canary set was chosen as a random sample of the
available ratings, we expect that the RMSE of the evaluation
set would follow the RMSE for the canary set. We chose
el = 2 and eu = 2.1 as the user’s expected lower and upper
accuracy bounds for the canary set.
Fig. 4 shows the average RMSE in predictions evaluated
for the canary set of randomly selected 100 users, for various
levels of obfuscation, as each user provides additional movie
ratings to the system. We introduce four baseline strategies
that correspond to different fixed obfuscation levels; no, low,
medium and high, in which the user samples noise from the
same distribution and adds it to each rating before forwarding
it to the system. Each point in the plot is obtained by
averaging the RMSE over 100 simulation runs per user, and
then averaging it over the 100 users.
As discussed in the previous section, the RMSE of the
baselines decrease over time, despite the addition of noise, as
the effect of the white noise averages out as the user rates an
increasing number of items. In contrast, when using adaptive
obfuscating of user ratings, the user agent aims to keep the
RMSE of the canary set stable over time, within the accuracy
bounds set by the user (i.e., on average the prediction error is
kept at about the same level).
To evaluate the performance of the recommender system, we
plot in Fig. 5 the average error in RMSE over the evaluation
set over time (as the users rate more movies) for various
obfuscation levels. Obfuscation imposes a penalty, increasing
the error in prediction. However, similarly to the canary set
RMSE, the impact of obfuscation on prediction error fades as
the users keep using the same fixed obfuscation level (see the
baselines corresponding to no, low, medium and high levels).
In contrast, the adaptive obfuscation algorithm effectively
keeps the average prediction error stable as users rate more
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Fig. 6. Average obfuscation level of the adaptive obfuscation mechanism
movies.
We note that the resulting privacy provided by the system
is best-effort, as, considering the privacy metric (differential
privacy) described in Section III-B, each individual rating item
belonging to a selected user will be protected according to the
corresponding level of obfuscation noise.
1) Choice of the Canary Set: To evaluate how the choice
of movies for the canary set impacts the performance of the
system, we further plot in Fig. 5 the RMSE of the evaluation
set over time, given a canary set that contains the highest rated
movies (i.e., “most liked” movies).
Since the baselines (corresponding to no, low, medium and
high obfuscation levels) are independent of the canary set,
they are essentially the same in both experiments. When
comparing the lines corresponding to adaptive obfuscation for
two different canary sets in Fig. 5, we observe that even though
the average RMSE of the evaluation set stays between the
boundary levels, choosing the mostly liked movies as canary
set yields lower average RMSE compared to the random
canary set.
To see how the obfuscation level adaptively changes to
provide stable accuracy in recommendations, Fig. 6 shows
the average obfuscation level over time for the experiments
with the different canary sets. The user needs to add more
noise (i.e., higher obfuscation levels) when the canary set is
chosen as the movies most liked by the users, compared to
the case where the canary set was selected at random. Albeit
on average, random canary allows the user to choose lower
obfuscation levels compared to other canary sets to stay within
the desired accuracy bounds, it is still unclear how much each
user’s prediction error over the evaluation set deviates from
the lower and upper bounds.
This motivates us to define a new metric called “user
boundary miss” (denoted by ∆k) of a user k who adaptively
obfuscates his ratings to investigate the efficacy of the choice
of canary movies. The user error ∆k, captures how much
the error in prediction of the evaluation set, i.e., RMSEEk ,
deviates from the desired accuracy bounds el and eu. To
quantify this, we consider the difference between RMSEEk
and el or eu and average it over the set of movies Hk that the
user k has rated using adaptive obfuscation:
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∆k =
∑
Hk
max{(RMSEEk − eu), 0, (el−RMSEEk)}/|Hk|
(9)
By averaging this metric over the group of users S (in our
case, it is 100 users) who adaptively obfuscate the ratings, we
can calculate the “group boundary miss” ∆S – how much a
group of users’ average error in prediction over the canary sets
varies over time from the desired accuracy bounds.
∆S =
∑
S
∆k
|S|
(10)
We use ∆S over different selection strategies of canary sets
(randomly chosen, movies the users like most, and movies the
users like the least) to evaluate the best selection strategy for
a canary set. Table IV shows ∆S values for different canary
sets. Most interestingly, choosing a random canary set causes
the RMSE to deviate more from the desired bounds, yet the
average still stays within the accepted boundary levels. In
contrast, choosing extremely rated movies (i.e., most or least
liked movies) for the canary set helps to keep the boundary
misses at the lower level. This validates the point made in [11]
that extreme ratings are representative of the users, and more
important when generating predictions.
TABLE IV
CANARY SELECTION METHODS AND USER ERROR
Canary Set ∆S
Random movies 0.854
Most liked movies 0.412
Least liked movies 0.475
C. Adaptive Obfuscation and Heterogeneous Privacy Prefer-
ences
In this section we investigate how the prediction accuracy
of a user who obfuscates the ratings adaptively, is influenced
by input obfuscation done by a proportion of other users in the
system. We consider a target user u, who adaptively obfuscates
his ratings based on a randomly chosen canary set and explore
the following scenario: a fraction of other users obfuscate their
responses with a privacy level p while the user u adaptively
obfuscates his ratings based on his canary set. For this scenario
we test the impact of the obfuscation conducted by other
users on the prediction accuracy of the user u. The aim of
this study is to see whether a user can effectively control his
prediction accuracy by probing the system and changing the
obfuscation level based on the feedback, regardless of other
users conducting obfuscation in the system.
In the first approach, which was evaluated in Section IV-C,
the user determined directly the privacy budget to spend, but
did not have control on the accuracy of the recommendations,
especially given the effect of other users’ privacy choices. In
contrast, in the approach considered in this section the user
has direct control on the accuracy of the recommendations,
but cannot determine in advance the privacy loss that will be
incurred to maintain this level of accuracy.
To evaluate the aforementioned scenario, we use the same
simulation setup described in Section V-B. The target user u
adaptively obfuscates and reveals his noisy rating for a new
movie i, while a proportion of the user community obfuscates
their ratings of the same movie with a privacy level p. We
calculate the average prediction error in the evaluation set of
target user u over all the movies he rated with adaptive noise.
We repeat this exercise with varying proportion of the user
community and levels of privacy.
Fig. 7 shows the RMSE in predictions for the evaluation
set of randomly selected 100 users. We choose el = 2 and
eu = 2.1 as the user’s expected lower and upper accuracy
bounds for the evaluation set. Each line of the plot depicts
the average RMSE in predictions of a user who adaptively
obfuscates while a fraction of other users in the system choose
no, low, medium and high privacy. Each point in the plot is
obtained by averaging RMSE over 100 simulation runs per
user and then averaging it over the 100 users.
We observe that when a user adaptively obfuscates his
ratings, his accuracy in predictions of the evaluation set stays
stable over time, despite the obfuscation conducted by other
users. In contrast to Figures 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c), adaptive
obfuscation of user ratings enables the user to keep the
accuracy fixed between the desired bounds regardless of the
fraction of other users who obfuscate their ratings.
We are also interested in the scenario in which a target
user and a fraction of other users adaptively obfuscate the
ratings, and evaluate the average error in the predictions of the
evaluation set of the target user. As evident in Fig. 7, adaptive
obfuscation conducted by the target user allows him to keep
the error in between the desired boundary levels regardless of
the obfuscation method leveraged by other users in the system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we evaluated how the accuracy of ratings that
a recommender system predicts for a user is affected both by
input obfuscation conducted by that user and by obfuscation
conducted by other users in the system. We showed that while
the user’s privacy choices would have the highest impact
on the resulting accuracy, the cumulative effect of other
users’ choices would also have a significant influence on the
prediction accuracy.
To allow a consistent performance of the recommender
system, within accuracy bounds set by the user, we proposed
and evaluated a privacy-aware interactive recommender system
that can be probed by users to understand how well they were
profiled by the system. Specifically, the system is requested to
predict the ratings for a set of undisclosed items, the canary
set. Obfuscation of ratings can take place on the client side,
so this approach does not require a fully trusted recommender
system. Users can obfuscate their inputs based on their level of
comfort and based on the error in the predictions of the canary
set, while receiving reasonably accurate personalized recom-
mendations from the system. We evaluated our system off-line
using a dataset of movie ratings, and showed how users can
tune their noise level to receive meaningful recommendations,
while maximizing obfuscation within the accuracy bounds.
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